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THE DESCRIPTIVE PROBLEM OF EVIL 
Brad J. Kallenberg 
 Earth’s cramm’d wi’ heav’n 
And every bush and tree with fire of God; 
  But only he who sees 
  Takes off his shoes.  
   —Elizabeth Barrett Browning 
1 Introduction 
Language is like the cane in the hand of the blind person. The better one 
becomes at getting around with the cane, the more he or she is apt to forget 
the cane but through the cane perceive the objects scraped and tapped by 
the other end. A defective cane may distort the world perceived by the blind 
person. So too, defective use of language threatens to muddy our under-
standing of the things we talk about. When discussion something as diffi-
cult as natural evils, a frequently undetected defect in our language use is 
“overly attenuated description.” In what follows, I will sketch three condi-
tions under which attenuated description multiplies confusion in general 
conversation. I will then describe ways in which the lexical shortcuts taken 
in discussion about “natural evils” can be corrected. Although it remains to 
be seen whether conversants are willing to pay the cost involved. For, in 
order to talk most clearly about “natural evil,” and thus understand the 
problem most deeply, those doing the talking must employ descriptions 
that require correlative practical actions in order to be intelligible. I give an 
example of how the juxtaposition of two components, rich descriptions and 
appropriate action, makes possible the trained eye to perceive a pattern 
that, while falling short of an explanation per se, serves as a satisfactory 
response to natural evils. I conclude my essay by proposing a protocol for 
advancing the conversation about natural evils. 
2 Humans Respond to Evil by Talking 
It is a matter of historical record and empirical fact that natural phenom-
ena can bring about intense suffering. The fact that suffering, which is en-
tailed by tsunamis, wildfires, earthquakes, tornadoes, floods, lightening 
strikes, etc., is unwanted, unnecessary, undeserved, or overkill is bound up 
with the very concept “suffering.”1 
Humans respond to instances of suffering in their environment with a 
variety of reflexive behaviors. Ludwig Wittgenstein called all such behav-
ioral responses “primitive reactions.” This term is helpful for expressing the 
fact that human beings, like other animals, respond to their physical envi-
ronment in physical ways.2 In the face of relatively minor pain we brace 
                                                      
1 For a catalogue of types of suffering, see Wildman’s essay in this volume. 
2 The term is a little misleading if we think that primitive means something like 
“presocial” or even “prerational.” For Wittgenstein, primitive reactions could be 
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ourselves, we wince, we cry out, we pout. As biological creatures, these re-
actions are primitive and reflexive. Just as primitive and reflexive are our 
reactions to the suffering of others: we weep, we touch, we empathize, we 
hug, we offer aid, we ward off others from danger, we shelter the children, 
and we attempt to avoid future instances of similar dangers. All such ha-
bitual reactions (and more) constitute the complicated form of our life as 
human animals. 
One set of behaviors among all those that human beings perform in re-
sponse to pain and suffering, is that of verbal behaviors. We are the ani-
mals, who more than any other, respond to our surroundings audibly. Hu-
man beings respond to their world by talking. We call for help, we offer 
words of comfort, we recount the event to others, we educate the children, 
we discuss blame for past events, we strategize for the future. And so on. 
One tiny fraction of all the conversations we have about any particular 
tragedy is the puzzling we do together over events that seem beyond hu-
man control. Of course, sometimes when we ask Why? we are not looking 
for an explanation but simply sighing. Yet on occasion, perhaps when we 
are at a relatively safe distance from tragedy and suffering, we talk in or-
der to make the best sense we can of the offending event. We instinctively 
hope that our conversation will produce an adequate explanation of evil. 
While an explanation may put an end to our questions (as explanations 
may occasionally do), more often than not, what we are really after are not 
explanations but rather ways of telling the story of our lives in a way that 
encompasses tragedy in a satisfactory way. 
I use the term “satisfactory” as a way of reminding us that the vast 
majority of our lives as physical critters is governed by the metric of “satis-
factoriness.”3 For example, engineers compete among themselves to offer 
solutions to a particular design problem. Some proffered designs may be 
clearly unsatisfactory. But obviously, there may be many “satisfactory” de-
signs. Granted, some designs may be more satisfying than others with re-
spect to a given set of contextual constraints. But on no grounds is one war-
ranted in concluding that there is a single, logically-compelled “correct” 
design. 
If verbal responses to evil fall under the class of physical behaviors 
humans perform to cope with a particular physical environment, then it 
makes sense to evaluate these verbal behaviors in a way similar to the way 
we assess engineering projects: is it “satisfactory?” For, conversations 
around the Why? question are themselves a form of verbal design. The con-
straints against which a “satisfactory” description of suffering is assessed 
includes, among other criteria, its fit with the complicated form of life 
shared by speakers. But whose form of life is in view? For the purposes of 
this present essay, I am presuming a reading audience composed of scien-
tifically-minded religious believers. So, on the one side, a “satisfactory” ver-
bal response must comport with the best scientific practices and models 
available. On the other side, the “satisfactory” answer must fit with the 
contours of a religious form of life.4 Just as it is true that not every natural 
                                                      
socially- or rationally-conditioned, though they need not be. See Kallenberg, Ethics 
as Grammar, 161–214.  
3 Kenny, “Practical Reasoning.” 
4 “Satisfactory” does not reduce to something that merely coheres with other 
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drive ought to be fulfilled nor every primitive reaction be deemed trust-
worthy, so too, for religious believers not every askable question is worth 
asking. Truth is, in the communal practice of living well that goes by the 
name “religion,” some questions ought not be asked, since the artful habit 
of resisting the asking of some questions is taken by the group to be itself a 
crucial part of the larger project of shaping this group’s moral habits (vir-
tues), particularly their habitual manner of seeing the world. 
Iris Murdoch once observed that we can only act in the world that we 
see.5 One way to think about “vision” is to list the variety of aspects under 
which (or “lenses” through which) we view our environment. For example, a 
bridge can be viewed under the aspect of structural integrity or it can be 
viewed under the aspect of artwork (or romance or politics or theology; i.e., 
bridges themselves may be speech-acts). Each aspect corresponds to a dis-
tinct manner of interrogating the bridge. Not every person is equally 
skilled in considering the bridge under a given aspect. In this example, the 
aspects of artistry and engineering are not mutually exclusive, they are 
complementary. In other cases, skills for one way of observing may inter-
fere with skills required by the complementary aspect. Balancing these 
demands is part and parcel of what counts as “satisfactory.” 
I hasten to point out that despite the priority we tend to assign to some 
batches of words over others, every “satisfactory” verbal design will have to 
vie for acceptability against the field of other satisfactory designs. Within 
communities who view their environment under both the aspect of science 
and that of religion, no verbal responses to the Why? that surrounds suf-
fering has an automatically privileged status in the common life. Like all 
other speech acts, sentences are spoken not to the wind, but to and with 
each other. As such, our sentences are measured for their felicity by how 
well they are taken up by our conversation partners and grounded by sub-
sequent behavior.6 As is always the case, any given speech act is open to 
lexical ambiguity, semantic misunderstanding, and grammatical confusion. 
But the most satisfactory speech act is the verbal design that minimizes 
such difficulties. 
But there is a linguistic gopher that, because it is so often overlooked, 
cuts off fruitful conversation at the root. This pest is the habit of using the 
phrase “natural evil” as an adequate description for naming what is being 
talked about. In this essay, I challenge this designation as overly simple 
and the breeding ground for grave confusions that preempt the satisfac-
toriness that our conversations about suffering might otherwise achieve. I 
will show that just as attenuated descriptions in ethics render moral obli-
gations invisible, so too attenuated descriptions of “natural evils” make the 
plausibility of religious belief virtually disappear. Additionally, in this pa-
per I argue that broadening the description with respect to narrative time 
and space helps us perceive the description for what it is: a speaker-in-
volving speech act. What I propose amounts to a shift in focus from the 
talked-about-subject (“natural evil”) to the formerly transparent linguistic 
                                                      
propositional statements, since the religious form of life itself cannot be reduced to 
assent to some set of propositions. 
5 Murdoch, “Vision and Choice in Morality.” 
6 I take as a benchmark for intelligibility, Wittgenstein’s dictum: “Practice gives 
the words their sense.” Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 85e.  
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behaviors themselves. The upshot of this shift will be the emergence of 
formerly unnoticed relevant patterns from the now rich descriptions to the 
end that a fitting response to the so-called “natural evil can be disclosed. 
3 Attenuated Descriptions of “Natural Evil” Hinder Conversations 
about Suffering 
Attenuated description is a common occurrence in conversations between 
persons who are adequately fluent. But attenuation is a bad idea under 
three conditions. 
3.1 When Conversing with the Nonfluent 
Taking shortcuts is human nature. It is not more precise to say “hand to me 
the four-foot pole with the 907 bristles bound together and attached to the 
one end” than to say simply, “hand me the broom.” We instinctively con-
serve our energy in speech as well as in labor. “Broom” enters the English 
language as the name of a family of artifacts ranging from whisk brooms to 
broom trees and everything in between. If on this occasion, there happens 
to be an array of brooms to choose from, the listener would likely “read” the 
context instantaneously (e.g., we are standing in a garage) and select the 
proper broom (i.e., the push broom) for such an occasion. The usefulness of 
the word “broom” depends both upon the fluency of the listener and the lis-
tener’s aptitude for reading the surroundings.  
Naming is the most common form of attenuated description. But 
names can be misleading and may even hinder communication if fluency is 
in short supply. For example, the sentence “F equals m multiplied by a” is 
only recognized as true for those who are fluent in the terms. It may not 
help the uninitiated to learn that F, m, and a go shorthand for “force,” 
“mass,” and “acceleration.” After all, the following sentence, while gram-
matical, is sheer nonsense: “The force of love equals the mass of the cheese-
cake multiplied by the acceleration of the economy.” Clearly, “What force?” 
“What mass?” and “Which acceleration?” are questions that cannot be an-
swered simply by affixing more labels. What is needed in this case is the 
tutoring of the novice by means of a progressively complex series of stories 
the response to which cultivates the requisite skill of similarity recognition 
by the novice to the end that he or she becomes able to carry on conversa-
tions about “F =ma.” 
3.2 When Facing an Impasse in the Conversation 
A second instance in which attenuated description can perpetuate confu-
sion is when the referent is ambiguous. If one overhears a conversation 
about a famous dead Greek person named Aristotle, one is likely to enter a 
conversation on the assumption that Plato’s most famous pupil is the refer-
ent to the name “Aristotle.” But if the next topic to arise is the referent’s 
personal wealth, perplexity would abound until it became clear that the 
“Aristotle” in question was not a philosopher, but the famous dead Greek 
who married John F. Kennedy’s widow in 1968 and who himself subse-
quently died in 1974. Of course, the speaker can get some of the details 
wrong (Aristotle Onnassis actually died in 1975) and still achieve under-
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standing simply by filling in enough details to disclose the referent’s iden-
tity. How much detail is “enough” is of course a function who the listener is 
and of how much skill is required to read the surroundings. 
3.3 When How to “Go On” Is Uncertain 
A third instance in which attenuated description muddies the water is re-
lated to the second. Attenuated description not only breeds perplexity about 
the identity of the referent, it fosters confusion about how to go on. Con-
sider the following example. Francis of Assisi is championed as the para-
digm of charity. Refusing to take over his father’s prosperous enterprise, 
Francis disavowed his family wealth by stripping naked and swapping his 
rich man’s tunic for the flea-ridden rough shirt of a local beggar. Thereafter 
becoming the most famous of the mendicant preachers, Francis’s self-
induced poverty is taken by some to be a morally supererogatory habit. If 
however, I model my own life after St. Francis and give away my fortune 
(ha!), I would not be acting in imitation of St. Francis. Why? Because his 
life and mine are similar only under vastly attenuated descriptions: “relig-
iously minded males intent on growth in personal holiness.” If the descrip-
tions are expanded only slightly to include marital status (Francis never 
married, Kallenberg is married and father of three children), then the vol-
untary poverty that is supererogatory in Francis’s case may prove to be 
downright immoral in my own.7 
With simple illustrations in hand, it is now possible to see how conver-
sations about “natural evil” have been infected by overly attenuated de-
scriptions in ways that multiply confusion. 
4 Recent Descriptions of Natural Evil Have Been Attenuated 
There are at least three ways in which descriptions of “natural evil” have 
been unwisely attenuated in contemporary conversations about theodicy. 
Confusion enters the conversation when (1) occasions of suffering are de-
scribed in self-distancing ways, when (2) the narrative context is overly 
compressed, and when (3) the range of acceptable causal explanation ex-
cludes nonefficient forms of causality. 
4.1 Overly Restricting the Involvement of Human Agents in the 
Description 
Objectivity is a virtue in the humanities as it is in the sciences. For exam-
ple, in historiography, theologically-minded historians presuppose a stance 
of “methodological atheism” in order to do their practice well.8 This is as it 
should be. Yet both scientists and theological historians can testify that in 
the study of objective data, patterns often emerge from the data. As not 
everyone seems able to see the pattern, it is difficult to make the case that 
the pattern is actually in the data. Consequently, the pattern is probably 
best understood as a function of the interplay between the data and the ob-
                                                      
7 I owe this anecdote to Nancey Murphy. 
8 Tilley, History, Theology, and Faith. 
BRAD J. KALLENBERG 
 
302 
server.9 I suggest that the term “natural evil” names just this sort of pat-
tern, the sort of uptake that requires a high degree of involvement by the 
observer with the data. 
4.1.1 “Natural Evil” Names a Pattern 
When we consider any event under the rubric of “evil,” we are implying 
that more than objectivity is required to correctly name it.10 For this rea-
son, in some cases, objectivity serves to obscure rather than clarify 
descriptions. 
Imagine I spy a little old lady being savagely mugged across the park-
ing lot. I turn to you and say in a monotone voice, “It is 11:30 pm EST on 
the 11th of November 2005 and I am beholding a 92-year-old, 100-pound 
white female being struck 6 times within the span of 5 seconds by a 200-
pound, 31-year-old male holding a 24-inch length of -inch pipe his right 
hand.” Imagine this statement is factually correct. Yet things are horribly 
wrong. The “objective” description of the event involves mis-description 
precisely for what it leaves off in the name of objectivity.11 Vocabulary such 
as “mugging,” “wielding,” “accosting,” “beating,” as well as “savagely,” 
“gruesomely,” and “mercilessly” are all emotionally laden terms, but surely 
the most appropriate terms for completely and correctly describing this 
event. However, the ability to render just such a description accurately im-
plies something about the self-involving character of truthful description. 
To spring forward with a cry, “Oh no! She’s being mugged! Stop! Help! 
Police!” is a more truthful speech act and therefore an indication that the 
description ought not be reduced to the aspect of objectivity.  
When a jury is later given eye-witness testimony, now properly de-
posed in an objective voice, it is not exclusively their objectivity that en-
ables them to deliver a fair verdict. If objectivity alone delivers a just ver-
dict, then justice would be the sort of thing that could be looked up in a 
table. (“Let’s see . . . a frequency of striking that exceeds one strike per sec-
ond is defined as “wanton and malicious, ergo . . .”) Rather, judgment is 
rendered fairly by means of the jurors’ abilities to reconstruct the event and 
imagine it in all its original resplendent horror. Such imaginative skill is 
common, though it is not automatic. A young child would be unable to re-
construct the original event, as are those who are emotionally or psycho-
logically defective in certain ways. Such skill is not an innate talent, but 
requires that one be able to see events under aspects that necessarily in-
clude objectivity, but also crucially exceed it. 
Lest the emotional component of witnessing assault and battery eclipse 
the point I am trying to make, let me summarize: the aspect under which a 
natural phenomenon is best observed, one which allows the observer to af-
                                                      
9 See reception theory of Hans Robert Jauss with respect to philosophical her-
meneutics and, more popularly, the Reader Response Criticism of Stanley Fish. 
Jauss, Toward an Aesthetic of Reception; compare Fish, Is There a Text in This 
Class? 
10 It is well known that data does not speak for itself. See, e.g., Vesilind, “How to 
Lie with Engineering Graphics.”  
11 D. Z. Phillips writes of this in numerous essays. Those new to his work can 
find no better place to begin than his Introducing Religion. 
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fix the label “natural evil,” necessarily includes more from the witness than 
simply his or her acquisition of facts. Even in cases where emotions are not 
so near the surface as the parking-lot mugging, to view through the lens of 
ethics requires of the observer an aesthetic-like engagement with the data. 
I am not saying that ethics is merely about taste. I am saying that ethical 
perception must be trained in ways similar to those that cultivate apprecia-
tion of art.12 The upshot is this: when natural “evils” are described as mere 
natural phenomena, an incomplete story is told. In order to achieve truth-
ful description, the rest of the story must be told. The telling of the rest of 
the story will require greater participation of the speaker than is required 
of an objective witness. 
4.1.2 Aspect Seeing as Self-Involving 
Walking through the mall, I was brought up short outside a store window. 
Inside a group of people stood gawking at a picture. Several kept moving 
towards the picture then away, now leaning this way then that, while their 
companions pointed over their shoulders at the painting. Curious, I asked 
what all the fuss was about. One of the bystanders told me that the picture 
was a computer-generated stereogram. As I listened, I learned that to see 
the 3-D image (in this case a dinosaur), one needed training in viewing the 
geodesic confusion in a certain manner. 
Was he pulling my leg? Was a dinosaur really there in the picture? 
Until I had been adequately trained, I would not be able to tell for myself. 
Nevertheless, the fact that there was an image there could be deduced from 
the reactions of the other admirers. One by one they exclaimed, “Oh! I see! 
It’s a dinosaur!” or “There’s a volcano in the background.” Their cries were 
spontaneous and uncoerced. I suppose that some may have been carried 
along by the enthusiasm of the others and simply pretended to see. But 
their skills could have been tested by asking them what they saw in the 
next stereogram (it was a flying saucer). As a (nonparticipating) bystander, 
my belief in the “reality” of the dinosaur at this moment was limited to de-
ductions drawn from my observations of the spontaneous reactions of those 
whose skills were more up to the task than mine. But if I wanted to see it 
for myself, reason dictated that I follow the suggested protocol (“Stand 
three feet in front of the picture and stare at your reflection in the glass.”) 
For any given experience, human participants can be divided into two 
camps: those who see it and those who don’t. Often enough, everyone sees. 
In fact, human insight is so uniform that we often slide unwittingly from 
the belief “The pattern is self-evident to me” to the conviction “No one can 
possibly deny that the pattern is really there.” Yet not everyone sees an ob-
ject in a technical drawing, sees beauty in a printed music score, sees num-
bers on a display as data, sees the function in a mechanism, sees a whole 
world in a book.13 Of course, those who cannot see are not warranted in 
denying the reality of the thing in question any more than those who do in-
deed see the pattern are warranted in asserting the “undeniable reality” of 
                                                      
12 Kallenberg, “Ethics as Aesthetics” in Ethics as Grammar, 49–82. 
13 Ferguson, Engineering and the Mind’s Eye; Frei, Eclipse of Biblical Narrative. 
See also Barth, “Strange New World within the Bible.”  
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that which is, after all, a pattern the perception of which depends as much 
upon training as upon the data.14 
Communication within a linguistic group is enabled by agreement in 
reactions and judgments in response to the seeing of a particularly pat-
terned world. Communication between two different groups, where what 
goes for shared judgment within one group may be only barely imaginable 
to the other, must begin with each group noting the similarities and differ-
ences between the two respective sets of spontaneous reactions. Even be-
fore the outsiders have had a chance to undertake insider's training in re-
actions and judgment, the reality of a thing or event or pattern may be 
charitably supposed by the outsiders on the basis of the visible behavior of 
members of the community fluent in such things.15 
The word “evil” does not belong to the vocabulary of objectivity. That 
we instinctively employ the term “evil” with respect to some natural phe-
nomena indicates that the door has been opened for seeing these phenom-
ena through moral and theological lenses as well as through the lens of 
"objectivity.” To the extent that one lacks (or refuses) training appropriate 
to ethics and theology, such a one remains as a deaf person who may provi-
sionally conclude that music is real but must content themselves with 
someone else’s description of a lively concert. Until one undertakes the 
training necessary for seeing the world under these additional aspects and 
engages the world in the correlative manner, one is left with a merely ob-
jective, which is to say impoverished, view of the world.  
A second way natural evil receives attenuated descriptions is when too 
much of the background is left out of the description. 
4.2 Overly Restricting the Narrative Context of Description 
The Solvag Conference in Brussels in the fall of 1927 signaled a definitive 
victory for the Copenhagen school of quantum physics as Bohr pain-
stakingly solved each daily puzzle Einstein proposed. The “duel” between 
Einstein and Bohr (as Heisenberg later dubbed it16) epitomized what 
Thomas Kuhn would later call the “proliferation of paradigms” that follows 
the demise of the received account while rival schools of thought struggle 
for supremacy over each other.17 One of the sticking points between Bohr 
and Einstein was whether mathematics referred to anything real.18 
                                                      
14 Nor does the spontaneous reaction of trained observers tip the balance toward 
the ontological realists. For the lack of response among the group that cannot see is 
itself a primitive reaction from which the third-party conclusion might be deduced 
with equal validity: there’s nothing there. On the role of observer skills in perception 
see Wykstra, “Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering.” 
15 Wittgenstein thought that all language worked this way. The reality of the 
runaway bus is not in question until it runs me over. It is already shown by the fact 
that everyone jumps out of the way—including, importantly, the blind person who 
speaks English and jumps in response to the cry: “Watch out for the bus!” 
16 “Commentary of Heisenberg (1967).” 
17 Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions.  
18 Quantum mechanics constituted a revolution in thought. “It is not a new 
chapter in the ontological tradition [of Western philosophy] but rather a phase of an-
other evolution. The source of this evolution is mathematics, not philosophy. Its 
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Einstein believed that there were “perfect laws in the world of things ex-
isting as real objects.”19 For his part, Bohr could not deny this. But neither 
could he affirm Einstein’s simple realism. Bohr saw that human language 
is itself the culprit that prevents us from settling the question: “we are sus-
pended in language in such a way that we cannot say what is up and what 
is down.”20  
When the reality of the quantum world was at stake, Bohr observed 
that like all other English words, the word “‘reality’ is a word in our lan-
guage and that this word is no different from other words in that we must 
learn to use it correctly. . . .”21 But being the sorts of critters that human 
beings are, there are inescapable restrictions on how broadly we can prop-
erly use the term “reality.” On Bohr’s view, measurements in quantum ex-
periments can only be framed in terms of classical physics. It is this prob-
lem that raises the issue of how much context is enough in order for the 
description to be a truthful one. As Bohr’s problem resembles my present 
discussion, his solution may prove useful. 
Every atomic phenomenon is closed in the sense that observation of it 
is based on data obtained not by direct detection of the quantum particle 
but by recording the irreversible registrations displayed by suitable ampli-
fication devices.22 In other words, a measurement amplifies things up to the 
classical level, where “that” indeterminate electron becomes “this” discrete 
and unmistakable mark on the photographic film. Only with these ampli-
fied results can human beings, who are neither quark-sized nor photon-
fast, “describe” quantum events. These marks are observed, recorded, and 
subsequently discussed. But by the act of amplification a necessarily dis-
torted picture is rendered.23 Consequently, rather than settling the age-old 
problem about the existence of objective reality, quantum physics is the 
paradigmatic case of human inability to say anything one way or another. 
“The limit,” Bohr writes, “which nature herself has thus imposed upon us, 
of the possibility of speaking about phenomena as existing objectively finds 
its expression, as far as we can judge, just in the formulation of quantum 
mechanics.”24 
The problematic status of mathematical descriptions of the quantum 
world (are they depictions of an objective world or of the patterns humans 
happen to see?) did not lead Bohr to conclude that they weren’t worth 
                                                      
trend is a search not for ultimate reality but for rigorous use of language.” Petersen, 
Quantum Physics and the Philosophical Tradition, 129.  
19 “Bohr-Einstein Dialogue,” vi. Einstein was also reported to have said “If, 
without in any way disturbing a system we can predict with certainty . . . the value 
of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding 
to this physical quantity.” Petersen, Quantum Physics and the Philosophical Tradi-
tion, 166.  
20 Cited in Petersen, Quantum Physics and the Philosophical Tradition, 188.  
21 Ibid., 172. Emphasis added. Here Bohr seems to borrow from Wittgenstein 
(Philosophical Investigations, §43). 
22 Bohr, cited in “Bohr-Einstein Dialogue,” 7. 
23 If elections are non-local entities, we would have no way of detecting the 
property of “non-locality” since amplification devices necessarily register the effect of 
electrons as localized entities. 
24 Ibid., 3.  
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troubling about. On the contrary, even if mathematical descriptions were 
human constructs, they were constructs that challenged the tidy way hu-
man beings conceived of their world. In order to compensate for the untidi-
ness, Bohr urged for expanding the context when describing quantum 
events in hopes that the quantum events might be anchored by a back-
ground we do understand. 
In electron interference, the physical “process” starting at the elec-
tron’s emergence from the gun and ending at its impact on the plate 
has no definable course. It cannot be broken up into physically well-
defined steps. Unlike classical phenomena, a quantum phenomenon 
is not a sequence of physical events, but a new kind of individual 
entity.25 
For Bohr the “inscrutability of the quantum event’s interior” is simply the 
result of the indivisibility that characterizes the quantum world.26 “Indi-
visibility” was Bohr’s term for a quantum event’s resistance to dissection. 
There are no tinier parts which can be treated in isolation and added to 
make up to the larger quantum event. The “movement” of the electron from 
gun to plate is a seamless whole. Rather rue human inability to zero in on 
the electron-as-particle-in-flight, quantum indivisibility led Bohr to insist 
that quantum description was incomplete until it was expanded. In other 
words, instead of doubling his efforts to break down the quantum event 
into tinier pieces, Bohr’s strategy was to expand the horizon to include not 
only the end conditions (most notably the markings on the photographic 
plate), but also other classical phenomena such as the initial conditions of 
the gun and even the table top.27 
On Bohr’s view, a perspicuous understanding of the quantum world 
cannot be achieved by the old-school strategy of divvying up each event into 
smaller and smaller events. To the extent that Bohr considered the issue of 
indivisibility and closure “of fundamental significance, not only in quantum 
physics but in the whole description of nature,”28 when we are faced with 
inscrutable mysteries in nature, we ought to resist the temptation to divvy 
the event into smaller and smaller steps but rather follow Borh’s protocol 
by viewing the event in a broader and broader context. 
It doesn’t take much imagination to expand Bohr’s protocol to enfold 
not just the table top but also the human observer as part of the initial and 
final conditions. Aage Petersen, one of Bohr’s last students, explains: 
In exploring the quantum world we are no longer detached observ-
ers, but we mold that which we describe. Thus quantum mechanics 
is not a description of nature as such but it has an observer-depend-
ent aspect. It is a description of nature as exposed to man’s method 
of questions.29 
Bohr realized he was faced with two radically different domains of 
cause and effect. Both domains belong to the natural world. The entities of 
                                                      
25 Petersen, cited in Ibid., 6.  
26 Petersen, Quantum Physics and the Philosophical Tradition, 173.  
27 Ibid., 171.  
28 Ibid., 177.  
29 Ibid., 141–42. Emphasis added. 
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the one are entirely unlike the “new kind of individual entities” of the 
other. The grammatical rules for speaking about the other constitute a ter-
ribly misleading way for speaking about the one. Under these conditions, 
Bohr concluded that the best strategy for understanding the quantum 
world was to expand descriptions of it to include more (rather than less) of 
the world in which we live. Bohr’s is a reasonable strategy for reconciling 
two dissimilar domains of cause and effect. Since religious believers are 
bent on claiming divine cause and effect (whatever that is) is displayed in 
the natural world, conversations about “natural evil” likewise straddles two 
dissimilar domains of cause and effect. In the fourth section of this paper, I 
will apply Bohr’s protocol of expanding the scope of description in conversa-
tions about inscrutable evils. But first I will add to the list one more 
tempting way to attenuate descriptions of so-called natural evils.  
4.3 Overly Restricting the Range of Acceptable Causes 
Third, contemporary descriptions of natural evil tend to unnaturally re-
strict what sorts of causes are acceptable answers to the question Why? 
From Aristotle up through the Baroque period in the West, investigators of 
natural phenomena framed their inquiry along four lines. They sought ac-
counts of efficient, material, formal and final causes. These four were taken 
as conspiring together to precipitate any natural event. 
After the Renaissance, emerging sciences tended to divvy up causal ex-
planation in a slightly different fashion. After describing the shape of con-
temporary causal explanations, I will suggest why the modern taxonomy of 
cause and effect is insufficient for conversations about “natural evil,” as it 
fails to account for all the natural causes in the mix. 
4.3.1 Science Restricts Itself to Uncovering Material and Efficient 
Causes 
By and large, contemporary science has restricted itself to the discovery of 
efficient and material causes.30 When considering what was previously 
known by the names “formal” and “final” causes, science has redivided the 
natural world into the domains of the technological and the natural. 
As regards technology, formal causes are lumped in with efficient 
causes. A given technology—say a bridge—succeeds because the human 
agents exert control over the materials by mastery of the formal properties 
that relate the materials to each other. Knowledge of the formal principles 
of trusses guides the engineer to construct a framework of overlapping tri-
angles rather than to duct-tape I-beams end to end. Final causes of tech-
nologies are less often explicitly considered. In the case of a bridge, the fi-
nal cause is a no-brainer: it’s for getting to the other side. In the more dicey 
                                                      
30 Strictly speaking, scientists do not seek material “causes” in the same way 
that medieval thinkers did. Clearly knowledge of material properties is determina-
tive for understanding how efficient causation proceeds. But the ancients understood 
material causes as playing an additional, almost agent-like role in the event. Thus 
the ancients would raise questions about the wisdom of creating new alloys, new 
viruses, new nano-products precisely because one can never predict what havoc these 
“agents” might wreak down the road. 
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case of nuclear warheads, scientists tend to defer to politicians and 
ethicists in matters of final causes. 
Unfortunately, this division of labor is not altogether satisfying for re-
sponding to cases in which technologies fail. If a bridge collapses in a dra-
matic way, an account of the material and efficient causes does not head off 
the urge of those touched by the tragedy from asking “But why?” Nor will 
observation of formal causes quell the question of Why? For example, just 
because we know that bridges tend to fail on a thirty-year cycle doesn’t re-
move the urge for us to ask “Why this bridge, and why today?”31 Human 
beings seem predisposed to react to the event as if the bridge, or perhaps 
technology in general, were itself an agent of evil since the Why? question 
expects an answer in the shape of a description of final causes. 
I suspect that human beings ask the Why? question in the face of natu-
ral disasters for the same reason they ask it when technology fails: they are 
requesting a description of final causes. If human beings do reflexively ask 
Why? then Aristotle’s fourfold account of causation may not be an outdated 
mode of reasoning after all, but one that corresponds to the very shape of 
human existence. We simply cannot stop ourselves from requesting expla-
nations of final causes whether or not the question itself makes sense.32  
A similar urge to ask Why? crops up in the face of nontechnological, 
which is to say natural, disaster. Of course, technological failures differ 
from natural disasters only in the sense that one sort of efficient cause 
(namely human beings) is taken as the classifying mark for the former but 
not the latter. To say a disaster is “natural” cannot mean that it differs in 
kind from a technological one, because human beings are clearly a part of 
the natural world. Rather, the class “natural disasters” is what remains of 
the set of all disasters once human beings are disqualified from the list of 
efficient causes. My complaint is that we too quickly exclude human agents 
from descriptions of natural events. This exclusion breeds confusion and 
prevents us from crafting satisfactory responses to the Why? question. 
Setting aside, for a moment, those disasters in which human beings 
are obviously complicit, we can ask whether it is intelligible to ask for an 
account of final causes as well as material, efficient, and formal. Clearly 
not every askable question is intelligible. So, it may turn out that our re-
flexive request for an account of final causes implied by the Why? question 
says more about human beings and our Feuerbachian projection of an 
Agent above, below, or behind the natural world, than about the way things 
really are. In response, I maintain that we ought not be overly hasty in 
ruling out requests for final causation in cases of natural evil. Our diffi-
culty in seeing final (and sometimes formal) causes often tricks us into de-
scribing events in ways that exclude, without warrant, the possibility of 
giving an account of final causation. We describe natural events only in 
terms of those causes that are most readily apparent to us. But attention to 
                                                      
31 Petroski, “Past and Future Failures.”  
32 Martin Heidegger, for one, thought that this question made eminent sense 
and our failure to realize this only makes us slaves to our technology. In his essay, 
“The Question of Technology,” Heidegger describes Technology, with a capital T, as 
something that takes on a life of its own. As such, Technology ought to be classed 
with other social structures, power relations, and emergent properties capable of ex-
erting top-down causal force in our world. See Heidegger, “The Question Concerning 
Technology”; for a theological interpretation see also Berkhof, Christ and the Powers.  
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the grammar of the word “cause” will show that the intelligibility of re-
quests for causes of any sort turn upon how human speakers conduct their 
lives. Consequently, it may be that our inability to properly hear, much less 
respond to requests for fourfold causal explanation of natural evils is more 
an indication of a defective way of living more than it is a lack of data.  
4.3.2 Grammar of “Cause” Demands Skillful Participation of an 
Observer 
In this section, I argue that (contra Hume) assignment of “cause” depends 
more on a skill of seeing than on a configuration of data. 
In his essay “The Limits of Empiricism,” Bertrand Russell argues that 
causation is not always arrived at by deduction, but in its simplest forms, 
causation is intuitively perceived: “We have reason to believe: that if any 
verbal knowledge can be known in any sense derived from sense experi-
ence, we must be able, sometimes, to ‘see’ a relation, analogous to causation 
between two parts of one specious present.”33 The simplest case occurs 
when we stub our toe on a chair leg and we immediately fault the chair. 
How did we know the chair is the cause of pain in our toe? We know this 
not by deduction but by a form of perception. Russell reasons, “when I am 
hurt and cry out, I can perceive not only the hurt and the cry, but the fact 
that the one ‘produces’ the other.”34 This runs against the general grain of 
the Humean insistence that “causes” are unperceivable fictions that we 
posit only after observing a regular series of events. (“The chair is station-
ary, my foot swings forward, there is a sound, my toe hurts, the chair is 
still stationary, therefore the striking of the chair causes the pain in my 
toe. Let’s try that again to make sure.”) It only takes one exception to dis-
prove the empiricist’s rule. Russell concludes therefore, “If we can some-
times perceive relations which are analogous to causation, we do not de-
pend wholly upon enumerations of instances in the proof of causal 
laws. . . .”35 
Russell criticized Humean empiricism for barring claims to certainty 
with respect to knowing a causal relation (short of an infinite string of data 
pairs). Russell was surely correct to say that the empiricist’s demand for 
“proof” of causation must come to an end somewhere. On my view, he was 
also right to say that it ends with a way of seeing. But in sharp contrast to 
Russell, his one-time student Wittgenstein showed that “seeing” causation 
did rest upon regularity, but not the kind of regularity that Hume sought, 
regularity of data (B1 follows A1, B2 follows A2, . . . Bn follows An, therefore A 
causes B). Rather, “seeing” causal links is a function of regularities in ways 
of acting for the speakers of a language. As mentioned above, Wittgenstein 
sometimes called this regularity “primitive reactions.” Some of our primi-
tive reactions are biological: we squint at bright lights, we pucker at lem-
ons, we sneeze at pepper. We also “instinctively look from what has been 
hit to what has hit it.”36 Yet others of our primitive reactions have been 
trained into us. For example, while social creatures (humans, chimpanzees, 
                                                      
33 Cited in Wittgenstein, “Cause and Effect,” 370. 
34 Ibid., 371.  
35 Cited in Ibid.  
36 Ibid., 373.  
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etc.) instinctively follow the gaze of tribe member, we must be trained to 
respond to signs, such as this arrow “” in this case by looking to the right. 
Regular ways of responding to our environment, both natural (following 
another’s gaze) and trained (turning right at the arrow), constitute the un-
questioning certainty from which language—in the present case, the lan-
guage of causality—grows. Wittgenstein concludes, “I want to say: it is 
characteristic of our language that the foundation on which it grows con-
sists in steady ways of living, regular ways of acting. Its function is deter-
mined above all by action, which it accompanies.”37  
Wittgenstein goes on to say that our ordinary language of cause and ef-
fect is fuzzy at both edges. On the one side, we have to admit “what a pow-
erful urge we have to see everything in terms of cause and effect.”38 Conse-
quently, we are overly quick to assign causes where none may exist. We 
have all had this experience: “Sometimes we think we are causing a sound 
by making a movement and then realize it is quite independent of us.”39 Yet 
not all nominations for an instance of cause and effect can be suspect. So on 
the other side, it is not the case that absolutely everything and anything 
can always and at any time be doubted. Those who sprinkle doubt on the 
most basic perceptions are confused about what it takes for language to be 
working properly.40 “The basic form of our game,” Wittgenstein writes in 
reference to the language game of cause and effect, “must be one in which 
there is no such things as doubt. . . . Doubting . . . has to come to an end 
somewhere. At some point we have to say—without doubting: that happens 
because of this cause.”41 In other words, there is a de facto limit both to 
gullibility and to skeptical demands for proof. 
Imagine following a moving string down the hall and around a corner 
to see who is tugging it. Suppose we catch him or her red-handed. Are we 
able to doubt whether the culprit is the primary cause of the string’s 
movement? So naturally do we say, “Aha! You did it!” that we cannot even 
imagine how someone could maintain the position of doubt while admitting 
“Yes, yes. I saw her pulling the string But how am I to know that this is an 
instance of causation?” If we conjure up in our imaginations such a hyper-
skeptic, could we also imagine that the matter could be settled by a series 
of experiments?42 Clearly not; if someone cannot recognize causation in its 
simplest form, he or she will be unable to grasp additional empirical dem-
onstrations of it. For proofs get their force from the fact that the paradigm 
cases of causality cannot be questioned. 
It seems then, that the concept of causation in every instance rests on 
human ability to “perceive” or “see” something as a cause. Mastery of 
everyday life and language governs the range of our primitive reactions 
with respect to causes so that we search for causes from the presence of at-
tention-getting effects (e.g., a loud voice in a room makes us look for a 
microphone). Likewise someone’s fluency both in specialized experience and 
in attending specialized language use trains him or her to see causes within 
                                                      
37 Ibid., 397.  
38 Ibid., 375.  
39 Ibid., 373.  
40 Language that isn’t working properly is gibberish or “idle” or “on holiday.” 
41 Wittgenstein, “Cause and Effect,” 377.  
42 Ibid., 387.  
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highly specific situations. Thus familiarity with physics’ laboratory and flu-
ency in the mathematical language of quantum mechanics trains the physi-
cist to extend adapted notions of cause and effect to lab experiments. If the 
scope of our application of the word cause is related to the specificity of our 
training, we can conclude that the sort of cause we look for is related to the 
conceptual lenses through which we have been trained to see.  
In this light, it makes sense to ask whether our regular ways of acting 
are sufficient for seeing broadly enough for handling cases of natural evil. 
It may be that our mute inability to give an “answer” to the problem of evil 
indicates a deficient way of living rather than insufficient data. The solu-
tion therefore, may not be to multiply words but to change the way we live. 
Space will not permit me to pursue this topic here.43 Sufficient for my pre-
sent purpose is an explication of how descriptions of “natural evils” might 
be satisfactorily expanded. 
5 Broadening the Descriptive Context 
5.1 Narrative Space 
In one of his classically provocative statements, Wittgenstein once observed 
that if his sofa were moved onto the front lawn, it would be tempting to say 
that it had become a quite different object. In some sense, the identity of a 
thing includes its connections to its surroundings. For example, while vis-
iting the Hermitage Museum I stood for many minutes in front of Rem-
brandt’s painting. Suppose I become quite taken by the color of one charac-
ter’s kind eyes and endeavor to paint my house this color because of the 
warmth it kindles in me. Were I to succeed in matching this hue (say, by 
some form of spectroscopy), I’d be terribly disappointed with the results, 
not because the house paint was the wrong spectroscopic hue, but because 
it will have become quite a different color. A color is what it is in a par-
ticular configuration with its surroundings. 
The same phenomenon holds for descriptions of objects and events. 
Consider the sentence, “Cadavers are frequently in the prone position.” 
Devoid of context, this sentence is trivially true. But the very absence of 
context bewitches us into thinking that what is primarily at stake is the 
truth or falsity of the sentence. 
Imagine now a different conversation. At a casual gathering, I begin to 
brag how nimble I am as a forty-seven-year-old distance runner. I recount 
how just this afternoon while running through the forest I nimbly leaped 
over a bolder, a cadaver, and a fallen tree.44 “Wait just minute! Did you say 
‘Cadaver’?” “What of it?” I reply, “Cadavers are frequently in the prone po-
sition.” If I calmly proceed to inform you how far I ran and at what pace, 
you’d think something was horribly wrong with me. Part and parcel of a 
proper description (in this case of cadavers) is the inclusion of a broad 
enough context so that what is really going on is made apparent. To leave 
out such details is substandard, even demented, by the canons of ordinary 
conversation. 
                                                      
43 See Kallenberg, “Some Things Are Worth Dying For.” 
44 I must credit my friend Charles Pinches for this fanciful story. See Pinches, 
Theology and Action.  
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Relevant context includes narrative space. It is important to the con-
versation about my nimbleness that an unnamed cadaver was encountered 
on a trail run. Had I instead been visiting the morgue in my capacity as a 
forensic pathologist and reported at a dinner party (with a twinkle), 
“Cadavers are frequently in the prone position,” you might think me hu-
morous, but not because any of the bodies were out of place. A cadaver be-
comes suspicious when it is discovered in surroundings in which we 
normally do not encounter cadavers. It does not become suspicious simply 
in virtue of being a cadaver in the prone position. 
As in the case of cadavers, important relevant details must be included 
from the surrounding context to render a description truthful. An example 
of the significance of expanding spatial context for describing natural disas-
ters can be seen in reports that surrounded the spate of tropical storms 
that have recently plagued the Atlantic. To cite but one example, tropical 
storm Jeanne ravaged the tiny country of Haiti in 2004. In the city of 
Gonaives alone, nearly 2,900 cadavers were recovered. Such a tragedy 
might easily prompt the question, “Where was God in September?” But this 
disaster is not yet properly described. If we expand the narrative space to 
include not just Haiti but the entire Atlantic seaboard, we learn that 
Jeanne’s strength grew after it passed Haiti, elevating it to hurricane 
status. Yet when hurricane Jeanne pummeled the Atlantic coast, only four 
persons died.45 The “tragedy” is evidently understood not by viewing the 
storm itself, but by viewing it in light of the enormous disparity of wealth 
between Haitian poor and rich North Americans. 
A similarly expanded re-description ought to be conducted for the 
Armenian earthquake. Fact #1: On December 7, 1988 an earthquake of 6.9 
magnitude struck and killed 25,000 people leaving some 400,000 home-
less.46 Fact #2: When a similar-sized earthquake struck California two days 
before Christmas of the same year, only three persons died.47 Fact #3: Civil 
engineers attest to the fact that the difference between the earthquake-safe 
construction and its alternative is an additional construction cost of a mere 
15%. Taken together, these three facts shift the description Fact#1 from a 
theodical problem to an economic, political, and moral problem. 
Not only must the spatial context of so-called natural evils be expanded 
to achieve a truthful description, the temporal context must also be 
expanded. 
5.2 Narrative Time 
5.2.1 Expanding the Narrative Context Prior to the Event 
In the first place, the temporal context must be described so as to include 
enough of what came before the event so as to render perspicuous the rele-
vant connections between this event with events that precede it. In Zettel, 
Wittgenstein observed “Only in the stream of thought and life do words 
have meaning.”48 So, for example, we may misunderstand a command is-
                                                      
45 Lawrence and Cobb, “Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Jeanne.” 
46 See US Geological Survey, “Earthquakes Facts and Lists.”  
47 See Branigan and Whitaker, “Dangerous Buildings.”  
48 Wittgenstein, Zettel, §31.  
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sued to us unless we have an adequate grasp of what came before the com-
mand. Once again, a concrete example can help show what I mean. 
Diseases such as tuberculosis are designated as “natural evils” since 
people, especially children, contract it through no fault of their own. It is 
my claim that not every case of TB implicates God as deeply as every other. 
In the opening years of the new millennium, the increase of incidence of TB 
on U.S. soil has epidemiologists worried. But this trend is made all the 
more troubling by what events preceded it. First, as Harvard cultural an-
thropologist and physician Paul Farmer has demonstrated, TB can have an 
astonishing 100% cure rate at minimal cost . . . provided the money is spent 
in the right places. In the protocol introduced to Haiti, Farmer was able to 
attain 100% cure rate for only $150–200 for persons treated in their homes 
compared to $15,000 to $20,000 for persons treated in a U.S. hospital set-
ting. The difference? Money was spent not simply in the treatment of the 
disease (the same in both cases) but in providing a small but continued food 
allowance that reversed the malnourished state of the poverty-stricken 
Haitians.49 Second, failure to eliminate TB in the West is made morally 
more serious by the fact that in the past 70 years the gap between the rich 
and the poor has dramatically increased. The rich-poor gap in the United 
States is the worst it has been since 1929; the top 5% of money makers 
owns 58% of the nation’s wealth. Only the top 10%—the very rich—have 
made economic gains over the past 20 years. Ninety percent of American 
wage-earners have actually lost ground. Yet the top 0.001% (some 13,400 
families) have had a wealth gain of 558.3%.50 These economic facts radi-
cally alter the identity of the evil of reemergent tuberculosis. Reemergent 
TB is not a “natural evil,” but most correctly described as a moral evil. 
It will surely be objected that not every instance of natural evil can be 
so readily dispatched. My response is simply this: until we expand the de-
scription enough in every case, we dare not say one way or the other. 
5.2.2 Expanding Narrative Context Subsequent to the Event 
In addition to expanding the temporal context prior to an event, a 
truthful description also requires skillfully expanding the context to in-
clude what follows the event. Recall Wittgenstein’s observation that we are 
able to understand a command, say one issued by an authority, to the ex-
tent we understand the context that precedes the command. Leave it to 
Wittgenstein to continue: “if the meaning-connection can be set up before 
the order [is issued], then it can also be set up afterwards.”51 It doesn’t take 
much imagination to see the possibility that the last line of a play or story 
may convey information that casts everything that happened previously in 
a new light, one that forces a re-reading of the entire work. My point is 
this: If history is itself narratively shaped, its “ending” may one day compel 
a reexamination of the entire story. If the ending is in some sense uncer-
tain (i.e., contingent rather than necessary), then knowledge of the ending 
cannot be logically compelled or scientifically predicted (though some theo-
                                                      
49 See Kidder, Mountains beyond Mountains; see also Satchell, “Wiping Out TB 
and Aids.”  
50 Morris, “Economic Injustice for Most,” 12–17.  
51 Wittgenstein, Zettel, emphasis added. 
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logians claim that the end of history is proleptically present in the resur-
rection of Jesus Christ52). In the meantime, we need not sit on our hands 
waiting for history to end before we begin writing a nonreductive descrip-
tion of disasters. But we do need to expand our description of the events in 
question in order to include both what came before and what happens after.  
A relevant part of what comes after tragedy is the immediate response 
of human animals to these events.53 Inclusion of human responses to natu-
ral disasters renders a truthful description of the way things are. 
5.3 The Way Things Are 
When descriptive context is taken broadly in the ways I am advocating, 
conversations are apt to become more lively. As descriptions widen in nar-
rative time and space, they become more contestable and hence more con-
tested. To the extent that such descriptions fall short of universal verifi-
ability, the descriptions will fail to garner unanimous acceptance. As 
disagreements get heated, it is tempting to strip down descriptions to 
something less controversial in order to gain wider acceptance. Unfortu-
nately, acceptability comes at a price: stripped down descriptions no longer 
have what it takes to do the necessary conceptual work. Still, within a lin-
guistic community (defined as those who rally around a particular thick de-
scription and share a determinate form of life) conversation is possible, be-
cause some statements stand firm and serve as the collective hinge upon 
which the rest of the community’s speech is anchored. These statements 
embody the community’s deepest notions about “the way things are.” 
Examples may be as obvious as “I am now wearing clothes” or as esoteric as 
“God is love.” 
A surprising possibility emerges when the descriptive context is ex-
panded to include statements which may be definitive for a given commu-
nity yet importantly lie outside the set of statements acceded by every 
speaker (“The sun rises in the east.”)54 When a rich enough description of 
the way things are is juxtaposed with a practical response to a given occa-
sion for suffering an arrangement properly deemed as satisfactory is 
achieved. Sometimes the proper action is to weep with those who weep. 
Sometimes it is most fitting to solve the presenting problem. Other times it 
is most appropriate to rush to relieve physical suffering. But when an ap-
propriate enough action is taken in the presence of a rich enough descrip-
tion, the arrangement of the two has the possibility of striking us as satis-
factory. There may be other satisfactory arrangements, and there is no way 
of telling in advance of talking about it which arrangement will turn out to 
be the most satisfactory. Yet clearly some arrangements are unsatisfactory. 
To recap, I explained above that attenuated descriptions will yield an un-
satisfactory arrangements just as surely as will the absence of an appropri-
                                                      
52 See Robert John Russell’s essay in this volume. See also Pannenberg, Jesus, 
God and Man.  
53 For a compelling account of the need for practical theodicy, see Don Howard’s 
essay in this volume. 
54 It is important to note that statements such as “The sun rises in the east” are 
not more certain for being shared per se; they simply are shared by many rather 
than shared by few. On Wittgenstein’s view, there is no private language. 
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ate practical response. But when both pieces are present, both a broad 
enough description of the way things are and a proper practical response, 
there exists the possibility of achieving a harmonic resonance as descrip-
tion and response become tuned to each other. Sadly, I cannot demonstrate 
this in any quantitative or logically compelling fashion; for this harmony is 
perceivable only by the one with ears to hear and eyes to see. 
5.4 “Explanation” as that which Supervenes upon the Juxtaposition 
of Theology and Action 
In his poem “Which,” R. S. Thomas writes of the religious believers’ re-
sponse to suffering: 
And in the book I read: 
God is love. But lifting 
my head, I do not find it 
so. Shall I return 
to my book and, between 
print, wander an air 
heavy with the scent 
of this one word? Or not trust 
language, only the blows  
that life gives me, wearing them  
like those read tokens with which  
an agreement is sealed?55 
The poet’s ultimate conclusion about whether there is a God of love, as 
Christians claim, turns upon the sort of data one is impelled to exclude. If 
one considers only “the blows that life gives,” one is hard pressed to keep 
reading a Book that speaks of a divine being that is both loving and om-
nipotent. But, if language is to be trusted, there is more to consider than 
simply the blows that life deals. What is it about language that make it a 
reliable compass for navigating the choppy waters of natural evils? It is 
simply this: verbal behaviors and nonverbal behaviors are inextricably 
bound together in the successful functioning of a complicated linguistic 
form of life a community of human beings inhabit.56 Consequently, both 
actions and words conspire to give a satisfactory response to natural 
disasters.  
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, words do not, and cannot, succeed in 
isolation. In other words, evil is not the sort of thing that can be adequately 
responded to by an explanation offered by a single person, or by a string of 
persons for that matter. If it were, the uptake of the explanation(s) would 
have long since been perceived as satisfactory and the problematic retired.  
I claim that in contrast to the stand-alone explanation, a “satisfactory” 
response to the enigma of suffering involves the perception of a pattern 
that emerges when properly rich descriptions are juxtaposed to concrete 
behaviors taken in response to a given occasion of suffering. The descrip-
tions I have in mind are broad in space and time, at least broader than 
typical descriptions of natural evils.  
                                                      
55 Thomas, “Which.”  
56 See Kallenberg, Ethics as Grammar.  
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I suspect that it is the constellation of adequate verbal and nonverbal 
responses taken together that strikes the believer as satisfactory. Satisfac-
tory, yes, yet neither necessary nor sufficient. A satisfactory constellation is 
never the only one possible. Portions of either element (i.e., verbal or non-
verbal) may be wrong and surely may be improved upon, for there is always 
more to be said. Moreover, an adequate description must also be “theologi-
cal” in the sense that it is not only a description of an event, but more prop-
erly a description of a pattern in the data taken by religious believers to be 
undeniably the way things are. In sum, I have argued for the possibility of 
achieving something more realistic than the ever-elusive explanation to the 
Why? question we pose to natural disasters. This possibility is the emer-
gence of a satisfactory constellation between description and action when 
these two are so tuned to each other than harmonic resonance is achieved. 
For persons who are capable of perceiving, the constellation not only is 
satisfactory, it has the force of a speech act. But who is the speaker? If the 
perceiver is a religious believer, he or she quite instinctively attributes his 
or her perception of the pattern as if it were a speech-act spoken without 
words by God. 
What follows is a twelfth-century example of the juxtaposition of theo-
logical claims about the way things are with a seemingly isolated work of 
mercy. Taken together, these disclose a satisfactory response to a single 
natural evil in southern France. 
6 The Theological World According to Hugh of St. Victor 
To recap, as biological critters, human beings respond to their environment 
in physical ways, by making noise and moving their bodies. Often noise-
making and movement are intentionally coordinated to achieve an effect 
that is larger than any one human animal can accomplish alone. Some-
times, though not always, a kind of synergy is attained even when noise-
making and bodily movement are not intentionally coordinated. I take as 
my example a book and a bridge. In the late 1120s, a monk in Paris wrote a 
book called Didascalicon for his students. In it, Hugh of St Victor reflected 
on the ways that the presence of evil (a.k.a., the absence of good) serves to 
orient human beings in their corporate quest for the God who alone is Wis-
dom. Several hundred kilometers to the southeast and five decades later, a 
teenage shepherd boy quit his day job to build a bridge over the Rhone 
River. Neither Bénezet nor Hugh were aware of the other. But their respec-
tive actions taken in response to the evils they saw achieve resonance. 
Hugh’s theology takes the brokenness of creation as a given. (He is, af-
ter all, an Augustinian.) But Hugh does not display any compulsion to rec-
oncile the brokenness of creation with the goodness of God, for God is 
known to us as much as a source of abundant redemption as eternal good-
ness (Ps 130:7). Hugh sees the brokenness of human beings and of their 
world as gesturing to what human life is for. Human beings alone are crea-
tures capable of imitating divine redemption by their appropriate response 
to the world’s brokenness. Doing this is itself sacramental: the picture that 
the redemptive human community displays is the very reality of what is 
being depicted. (A generation later, Aquinas would describe this sacra-
mental action as simultaneously human and divine under his doctrine of 
“double agency.” Human beings who imitate divine redemption by taking 
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redemptive action in response to particular cases, participate (a technical 
term for Thomas) not only in God’s being, as do all existent things, but in 
both the very agency and redemptive goodness of God.57) 
For Hugh, the brokenness of the world that makes natural evil a terri-
fying prospect is not as much a cause for alarm as it is the impetus for a 
quest. As fallen creatures living in an unpredictable and threatening world, 
Hugh maintains that human beings “are restored through instruction, so 
that we may recognize our nature.”58 God in redemptive grace has intended 
the very condition of human fallenness and nature’s brokenness as the im-
petus for our corporate pursuit of Wisdom, a quest which is the “highest 
curative in life.”59 All dimensions of human relations are directed by this 
quest. 
And so arose the pursuit of that Wisdom we are required to seek—a 
pursuit called “philosophy”—so that knowledge of truth might en-
lighten our ignorance, so that love of virtue might do away with 
wicked desire, and so that the quest for necessary conveniences 
might alleviate our weaknesses. These three pursuits first com-
prised philosophy. The one which sought truth was called theoreti-
cal; the one which furthered virtue men were pleased to call ethics; 
the one devised to seek conveniences custom called mechanical.60 
In this passage, Hugh asserts that redemption is assisted by the practice of 
“arts” that correspond with all the powers of the soul. Corresponding to the 
understanding (intelligentia) are both the theoretical arts (i.e., the contem-
plation of necessary truths; here Hugh intends theology, physics, and 
mathematics) and the practical arts (namely, the practice of morality and 
the cultivation of virtue). Corresponding to knowledge (scientia) are all the 
mechanical arts. These latter have to do with feeding, fortifying the body 
against harm, and the contrivance of “remedies” for alleviating physical 
weakness.61 
Unlike his predecessors, Hugh’s theological vision encompasses all as-
pects of human knowing, including the perennially maligned “mechanical 
reasoning.” By his day, “mechanical arts” had evolved into a very broad 
category. To be specific, mechanical arts was comprised of seven classes of 
practices: fabric-making, armament, commerce, agriculture, hunting, medi-
cine, and theatrics. (Granted, “theatrics” seems like a stretch, but Hugh 
purposed to make the list seven in number so that it matched the perfec-
tion of the seven liberal arts. Besides, under theatrics Hugh envisioned any 
                                                      
57 These points were made clear to me by Elizabeth A. Johnson’s wonderful 
essay, “Does God Play Dice? Divine Providence and Chance.” 
58 Hugh of St. Victor, Didascalicon 1.1, p. 47.  
59 Here Hugh shows similarity to Irenaeus’s take on the problem of evil. For a 
comparison of Augustinian and Irenaean theodicies see Hick, Evil and the God of 
Love [1968]. Though the term wisdom resonates with Platonic and Stoic philosophy, 
Hugh clearly equates divine Wisdom with the second person of the Trinity who is 
revealed as the Logos of creation and the Christ of the Gospels. See Taylor’s intro-
duction to Didascalicon, 14 n. 39.  
60 From Hugh’s Epitome Dindimi in philosophiam, cited in Taylor, introduction, 
12. 
61 Hugh of St. Victor, Didascalicon 1.8, p. 55.  
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coordinated activity of a group of people. Not just drama, but marching 
bands and gymnastics would fit under this heading. Had Hugh lived to see 
Ford’s assembly line, he surely would have treated it as a type of theatrics.) 
each mechanical art names a family of practices. For example, “hunting . . . 
includes all the duties of bakers, butcher, cooks, and tavern keepers” as 
well as those who actually do the gaming, fowling and fishing.62 And 
“armament” included material science, even metallurgy: “To this science 
belong all such materials as stones, woods, metals, sands, and clays.”63 
With this last move Hugh has managed to bestow honor even upon the 
grimy-faced smithy64 so consistently maligned for sixteen centuries. 
On Hugh’s account, all modes of rationality are mutually supportive. 
The ends of mechanical arts are displayed by the physical things contrived 
by the artificer. The “ends” of a device may be final with respect to the de-
vice but only provisional with respect to the ultimate end of human life re-
vealed in Christ: reconciliation of God and humans. In this sense, theology 
can benefit mechanical arts by providing a benchmark for assessing the 
aptness of its aims. But the benefit also works the other way around: 
mechanical arts benefits theology by rendering visible invisible things. 
Mechanical arts yields artifacts (and processes) that are inherently sacra-
mental because they render visible the final ends of mechanical reasoning, 
and in fact the final end of all human reasoning. Not only is the provisional 
or natural end of mechanical reasoning (namely, the alleviation of physical 
weakness) embodied in mechanical artifacts and processes. Mechanical 
reasoning also contributes to the incarnation of the ultimate or final end of 
human life (namely, our journeying toward reconciliation with all peoples 
and with God). 
Hugh is quick to emphasize the difference between worldly theology (a 
theology that moves from human knowledge to God) and graced theology (a 
theology that moves from God to human knowledge). Grace figures promi-
nently in Hugh’s account because he has no other way of explaining how 
human beings come to “see” more clearly. In his Exposition of the Heavenly 
Hierarchy, Hugh writes: 
Invisible things can only be made known by visible things, and 
therefore the whole of theology must use visible demonstrations. But 
worldly theology adopted the works of creation and the elements of 
this world that it might make its demonstration in these. . . . And for 
this reason, namely, because it used a demonstration which revealed 
little, it lacked ability to bring forth the incomprehensible truth 
without stain of error. . . . In this were the wise men of this world 
fools, namely, that proceeding by natural evidences alone and fol-
lowing the elements and appearances of the world, they lacked the 
lessons of grace.65 
                                                      
62 Ibid., 2.25, pp. 77–78.  
63 Ibid., 2.22, p. 76.  
64 Just as persons who were skilled at philosophy were called “wise,” so too were 
persons skilled in mechanical reasoning (techne) called “technicians.” Unfortunately, 
the term technai was used pejoratively rather than complimentarily of those who 
worked metal in front of the large furnaces. Such activity was regarded as beneath 
the dignity of free persons from Socrates’ day until the twelfth century.  
65 Cited in Taylor, introduction, 35.  
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What are these lessons of grace? For Hugh grace is not something added on 
top of nature, but the very Spirit of God that already permeates the created 
world and with which human beings may keep step (gratia cooperans). Al-
though the mechanism of grace’s operation in the natural sphere is elusive, 
if not ineffable, theologians who write of grace do not conceive of grace as a 
cause that stands in competition with other material or efficient causes. 
More commonly, theologians speak of the efficacy of grace in terms of illu-
mination. “Grace,” writes Hugh, is the powerful medicine that “was fit-
tingly given both to illuminate the blind and to cure the weak; to illuminate 
ignorance, to cool concupiscence; to illuminate unto knowledge of truth; to 
inflame unto love of virtue.”66 How do we account for a person coming to 
perceive for the first time a pattern that has been “in” the data all along? 
Hugh asserts that it is here we see God at work; the moment of illumina-
tion is called “grace.” 
7 A Premodern Practical Theodicy: St. Bénezet the Bridgemaker 
Hugh’s vision was not without practical corollary. During the solar eclipse 
of 1177, a teenage shepherd in southern France reputedly heard the voice 
of Jesus Christ telling him to build a bridge at Avignon. Because he was 
young and untrained, Bénezet was scoffed by the bishop. The river was 
surprisingly swift at Avignon, not to mention over a half-mile across. Even 
good swimmers died in the Rhone. But after the boy erected into place the 
first stone, one larger than could be lifted by 30 men, ecclesiastical support 
and financial backing followed. Bénezet died shortly before the bridge’s 
completion some eight years later. 
We have no way of knowing how well Bénezet understood the signifi-
cance of his project. We do know that in the twelfth century rivers posed a 
number of dangers. The Rhone river was capable of devastating floods. (For 
sake of comparison, in December of 2003, the floodwaters of the lower 
Rhone claimed the lives of seven people.) The river was also cold, swift, and 
wide.67 Crossing the Rhone was very hazardous, especially for the region’s 
meagerly equipped peasants. In view of these dangers, the Middle Ages 
looked on bridge-building as a charitable act, a work of mercy. 
But rivers contributed to more “natural” dangers than flooding and 
drowning. Human beings are part of the natural world, and for them rivers 
serve as political boundaries and as a form of protection against one’s ene-
mies. (The fact that rivers typically divided property owners meant that 
bridges frequently fell into disrepair as neither side of the river felt that 
upkeep fell on their shoulders.68)  
In 1177, the Rhone divided the County of Toulouse from the County of 
Provence and the County of Maurienne in the old Kingdom of Arles (the 
northern neighbor of Provence, identified with lower Burgundy). Turmoil in 
the area was exacerbated by two features. First, political boundaries and 
allegiances were constantly shifting. 
                                                      
66 Cited in Rydstrom-Poulsen, The Gracious God, 206.  
67 Students of history will recall the trepidation and care with which Hannibal 
moved his troops across the Rhone just a few miles north of Pont d’Avignon. 
68 Not surprisingly, St. Bénezet’s bridge today is in total disrepair. Of the origi-
nal 22 arches, only four remain standing.  
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Capable of magnificent feats in order to achieve expansion, the 
dukes [of Aquitaine, just to the north of Toulouse] had poor control 
over a vaguely defined area, subject to anarchic forces. The collapse 
of the Carolingian structures had given way to a whole system of 
relations, more or less binding, based on a temporary convenientiae. 
Ducal suzerainty was inconsistent, many-layered and unstable, 
castellanies virtually independent. All this was further aggravated 
by ecclesiastical privileges and a rapid decline in the public peace.69 
To cite but one example of the region’s political instability, land-hungry no-
bility north of Toulouse took Pope Innocent III’s call to a crusade (1204) as 
pretext for invading Toulouse en route to Jerusalem!70 
This political picture is complicated, second, by the fact that a count or 
viscount’s political clout was sometimes shared with a bishop (such was the 
case for the Archbishop of Narbonne in C. Toulouse) or even simply trans-
ferred to a bishop (such as at Albi in C. Toulouse).71 That churchmen were 
major players on the political scene is made more significant by the fact 
that the doctrinal stakes were extremely high in this region. Toulouse had 
been originally settled by the Visigoths who held to a heresy resembling 
that of the Arians.72 Although the Visigoths were conquered in the sixth 
century, the Arian heresy of the Albigenses had such a stronghold in 
Toulouse that the entire region “constituted a cancer in the body of Euro-
pean civilization that had to be rooted out at all costs.”73 So many of the no-
bility of Toulouse (perhaps even the count himself) and Provence were 
allied with the Arian sect that eventually a crusade (1208) was to be de-
clared directly against Toulouse and Provence (the two counties were to be-
come united by marriage).74 But even as early as 1163, the Council of Tours 
had called upon the secular powers to dispossess the “heretics” of their 
land.75 In the meantime, the heretics “were to be subject to a social and 
economic boycott so that they may be forced through the loss of human 
comfort to repent of the error of their way of life.”76 Sadly, as is often the 
case, it was the region’s poor who suffered most. For the least members of 
the planet, there is no difference between starvation by boycott and starva-
tion by famine. 
It was in this tumultuous context that Bénezet set out to build a bridge 
over the treacherous Rhone at the geographical corner of fierce political 
                                                      
69 Bur, “Kingdom of the Franks,” 543. 
70 In the ninth and tenth centuries, the Duchy of Aquitaine had contained the 
County of Toulouse within its borders. Ever since, northern noblemen had vied, 
though unsuccessfully, for these lands. Bur, “Kingdom of the Franks,” 542; Cantor, 
Civilization of the Middle Ages, 300.  
71 Bur, “Kingdom of the Franks,” 545.  
72 Cantor, Civilization of the Middle Ages, 113. Arians denied the full divinity of 
God the Son and were defined as heterodox at Nicea in 325 CE. 
73 Ibid., 389.  
74 In 1208, a papal legate had been murdered in Toulouse. The Count of 
Toulouse was himself implicated in the crime. Cantor, Civilization of the Middle 
Ages, 424.  
75 Robinson, “The Papacy, 1122–1198,” 337.  
76 Ibid., 336.  
THE DESCRIPTIVE PROBLEM OF EVIL 
 
321 
and doctrinal adversaries.77 Whether Bénezet, the mechanical genius, was 
even vaguely aware of the multiple layers of evil represented by the Rhone 
is immaterial to my point. Bénezet’s exercise of practical reasoning, born of 
need, is at once a redemptive and sacramental response to evil in the natu-
ral world. In the words of Hugh of St. Victor, the right use of human rea-
son, even mechanical reason, “reconciles nations, calms wars, strengthens 
peace, and commutes the private good of individuals into the common bene-
fit of all.”78 
8 Conclusion 
A three-dimensional jigsaw puzzle cannot be completed on a table top. 
Some of the pieces simply do not fit together on a flat surface. Any attempt 
to force the fit in two dimensions will be not only frustrating, it likely ruins 
the pieces. Even the best puzzlers may be stumped until they are given the 
right tip. “Well, that explains everything!” is the likely exclamation when 
they learn the puzzle is 3D rather than 2D. In this scenario, the key to un-
derstanding is not another puzzle piece, but a protocol for proceeding. 
In this essay I have argued that one way human beings respond to evil 
is by talking. Yet “natural evil” frustrates our attempts to speak directly 
about it. Natural evil is like a puzzle whose pieces do not easily fit together 
in a satisfactory way. My protocol suggestion is that what functions as a 
satisfactory “explanation” does not take the form of a “missing piece” nor of 
a bird’s-eye view of the “boxtop” (a 2D picture of what’s inside). In contrast, 
I suggest that a satisfactory defense supervenes upon the constellation of 
two components: (1) a rich enough description and (2) a set of practical ac-
tions. My essay has spent the greatest energy on the first element of the 
protocol. In particular, I’ve argued for the expansion of the descriptions 
that are given to natural evils. I’ve advocated increasing the participation 
of the observer in the speech-act of describing, expanding the range of ac-
ceptable causes, and broadening the narrative context of the description. 
What results is precisely the sort of conversation that constitutes theology. 
When theological dialogue serves as the backdrop to practical action at the 
same time practical action grounds the theological conversation, conditions 
are ripe for the emergence of an aspect, the dawning of which may strike 
some with the force of a satisfactory explanation.79 
                                                      
77 In 1309 Pope Clement V took up residence at Avignon. The fact that “the 
papacy eventually bought it outright from its ruler the Countess of Provence” implies 
that Avignon in Bénezet’s day had been a part of the County of Provence and thus 
more likely than not tainted by its heretical associations with Toulouse. MacCulloch, 
The Reformation, 35. See also “Map 12: The Angevin Empire.”  
78 Hugh of St. Victor, Didascalicon 2.23, p. 77.  
79 Where would I be without friends? I am extremely thankful to Michael 
Barnes, Aaron James, Ethan Smith, Terry Tilley, Nancey Murphy and my other 
compatriots at the CTNS for pointing out problems with an earlier version of my 
essay. Several of these problems turned out to be insuperable and forced me to write 
a (hopefully) better paper. Any difficulties that remain are, I’m afraid, completely 
mine. 
